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Abstract 
The conditions under which pension schemes merge is an important issue that has been under-
researched. Mergers can affect the strength of the sponsor’s covenant and the balance of power 
between the trustees and the sponsor, as well as the scheme funding ratio. This paper sets out 
two financial criteria to be met by any pension scheme merger:- no profit or loss on merging with 
another scheme; and no dilution of the funding ratio. After defining a merger basis for valuing 
the assets and liabilities, and allowing for adjustments to the funding ratio via side receipts and 
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Throughout this paper, merger refers to any situation where two defined benefit pension schemes pool their
1
assets and liabilities without any ring fencing or special sections, and active members of the transferring scheme
receive past service credits. This paper does not consider the administrative difficulties of merging schemes,
and the problems of replicating the benefit structures of both sets of pensioners and deferred pensioners within
a single scheme. Nor does this paper address the question of choosing a strike date on which the assets and
liabilities are valued. The one-off transactions costs, as well as any long run cost savings generated by merging
schemes, are not considered.
There are a number of reasons for the merger of defined benefit pension schemes:-
2
• a merger between two companies, followed shortly afterwards by the merger of their pension
schemes;
• one company takes over another (and then merges the pension schemes); 
• two schemes, previously run by the same employer, are combined; 
• a group of employees, all working for the same employer, is transferred from one company pension
scheme to another. [Strictly this is a bulk transfer, but the economic principles are similar.]
• a scheme merger may result from a company either joining a multi-employer scheme, or transferring
an additional group of employees into a multi-employer scheme. In 2005 the National Association of
Pension Funds was urging small schemes to form multi-employer schemes. 
If there is a substantial difference in size between the two schemes, any loss or cross-subsidy from the large
3
scheme on the merger may be trivial, and their trustees may be prepared to overlook such matters.
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It is increasingly recognized that, when taking over, merging with, or selling a company; careful
consideration needs to be given to the pension schemes of the companies concerned . For
1
example, in 2004 the takeover bids for WH Smith by Permira, and for Marks & Spencer by
Philip Green foundered on problems concerning the pension schemes, as did the bid by Duke
Street Capital for Uniq in 2005; while the Santander Central Hispano bid for Abbey National
only succeeded after they agreed to inject €950 million into the Abbey National pension scheme.
Since pension schemes can involve very large amounts of money, and the value of the liabilities
may be many times greater than the value of the employer; dealing with the pension schemes can
be an important aspect of the merger terms. Surprisingly, the effects of pension schemes on
company mergers or takeovers has only recently assumed importance, and little attention has
previously been given to this matter by researchers. 
This paper addresses the problem of setting the terms under which two defined benefit schemes
merge . There is considerable scope for variation in these terms, and the objective adopted here
2
is to devise conditions under which (a) the value of the assets and liabilities of the target
company’s pension scheme are in balance, i.e. there is no profit or loss on taking over another
scheme; and (b) there is no transfer of value from the members of one scheme to those of
another, i.e. the merger does not involve a cross-subsidy.  
3
There are many complicated legal restrictions on the operation of pension schemes in most
countries, and these rules are subject to constant revision. The purpose of this paper is to address
the fundamental economic issues of profit or loss and cross-subsidy, and the circumstances in
which such effects can be avoided. In this context, the underlying legal framework is not
considered in any depth, and some proposals may require legal changes in some countries. Recent
legislation in the UK has facilitated the economic approach adopted in this paper.
For expositional simplicity let firms A and B merge to form firm C, and let scheme A (the
receiving scheme) be the pension scheme to which all of the members of pension scheme B (theISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-09
If the trust deed and rules do not give them the power to initiate a winding-up, the trustees can make
4
representations to the Pensions Regulator for the scheme to be wound up. From 11  June 2003, the liabilities
th
on such a wind-up have been valued on a full buyout basis (including the administrative costs of the wind-up).
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transferring scheme)  transfer, to create the merged scheme, called scheme C. The problem is to
specify the conditions under which the merger is acceptable to the trustees of both schemes A and
B?
The merger criteria considered here will tend to be enforced because the trustees of scheme B
may either refuse to agree to the scheme merger, or trigger a winding-up of their scheme if the
receipts from a wind-up (including any share of the surplus on scheme B attributable to its
members) exceed the benefits of becoming a member of scheme C . Alternatively, rather than
4
merge with scheme A, the trustees of scheme B may consider using the assets of their scheme to
buy out the scheme liabilities; e.g. by the purchase of annuities and deferred annuities from an
insurance company, Chapman and Jagelman (1980, 1982); or they may continue as a closed
scheme. Conversely, the trustees of scheme A may be unwilling to receive scheme B if this leads
to the members of scheme A becoming worse off.
After explaining the zero profit and no dilution criteria, this paper argues that a merger can affect
the balance of power between the trustees and the sponsor, and the strength of the sponsor’s
covenant. A merger basis for valuing the assets and liabilities of the merging schemes is then
defined. After introducing side receipts and payments to adjust each scheme’s funding ratio, it
is concluded that simultaneously meeting both merger criteria requires that both schemes A and
B are at least fully funded. Since scheme funding levels vary with the state of the financial
markets, whether two or more schemes can reach a merger agreement depends on the financial
markets. Delay may mean that funding levels rise, and a merger which did not meet the criteria
specified in this paper becomes possible. Conversely, it is possible that, while the merger criteria
are currently met, this will cease to be the case if there is delay.
1. Alternative Views on Acceptable Terms for a Merger
There are two distinct views on setting acceptable merger terms for defined benefit pension
schemes, and these are outlined in this section.
1a. Zero Profit or Loss. The first view is that at the time of the merger the assets and liabilities
of scheme B should be in balance, leading to no profit or loss on the transfer. Members of
schemes A and B are deemed to have no interest in the size of their scheme surplus because (a)
they have no claim on any surplus (although this depends on the scheme rules); and (b) the extent
of any over-funding is irrelevant as, following GN16, the security of the pensions promise need
not be considered when devising merger terms. The trustees of scheme B will not wish to transfer
a surplus, while the trustees of scheme A will not wish to take on a deficit; and this leads to the
requirement that the assets transferred from scheme B to scheme A should exactly cover the
liabilities.
1b. Zero Dilution of the Funding Ratio. The criterion of no actuarial profit on scheme B does not
rule out a cross subsidy from scheme A to scheme B. This will occur if scheme A has a surplus,ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-09
If scheme A is in deficit, while scheme B is not, the merger will lead to a cross subsidy from scheme B to
5
scheme A.
Scheme members benefit from the entire margin of safety, while they may expect to receive only part of any
6
surplus as benefit improvements. 
Hammond (1962) supports the aim of preventing dilution when pension schemes are merged. He suggests four
7
possible responses to different funding ratios - 
(a) accept such differences if the acquired scheme is small, or if the difference in funding ratios is small.
(b) keep schemes A and B separate until such time as their funding ratios are equal.
(c) earmark or ring-fence the money paid in by scheme B, while all the assets of scheme C are managed
as a single pension fund. 
(d) the priority order on a wind-up of scheme C specifies different treatment for the former members of
schemes A and B. This would require the scheme to be sectionalized, which implies point (c) above.
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which is diluted on merging with a less well funded scheme . This view recognizes that members
5
of the two pension schemes are interested in the surplus per member because (a) they are
concerned about the margin of safety between the pensions promised and the funding available,
i.e. the funding ratio ; and/or (b) they have a legal claim on part or all of the scheme surplus, or
6
a reasonable expectation of sharing the surplus. In which case the situation changes substantially.
Members of both schemes A and B will wish to preserve or improve their initial funding ratio.
If the schemes have different funding ratios on the merger valuation basis (explained below in
section 2), side payments or receipts are required to produce adjusted funding ratios for schemes
A and B that are equal, so preventing any cross-subsidy or dilution .
7
1c. Other Criteria. The trustees of schemes A and B will also be concerned about the strength of
the covenant of scheme C’s sponsor, the balance of powers as between the trustees and the
sponsor of scheme C, and the potential for “flooding” - whereby the increase in membership of
the receiving scheme enables the sponsor to eliminate a surplus more quickly by a contribution
holiday, Greenstreet (2002).
Sponsor’s Covenant. It is likely that the sponsors of schemes A and B have covenants of different
strength. It is also quite possible that the strength of the covenant of the sponsor of scheme C (i.e.
the merged company) differs from that of schemes A and B. If firm A issues a lot of debt to
finance the purchase of firm B, it is possible that the strength of the covenant of firm C is inferior
to that of both firms A and B. Alternatively, the merger of firms A and B may generate
considerable synergies, so that the strength of the covenant of firm C is superior to that of both
firms A and B. It is also possible that the merger leads to a strengthening of the sponsor’s
covenant for the members of scheme B, and a weakening of the covenant for the members of
scheme A; and vice versa. 
The trustees of schemes A and B will presumably accept a merger in which the strength of their
sponsor’s covenant is increased, or remains unchanged. There are various ways in which the
merger can be structured to strengthen the covenant of scheme C:-
(a) The covenant of firm C can be strengthened by reducing the firm’s debt-equity ratio. For
example, if the merger is financed using largely equity, the covenant of firm C may be
stronger than that of firm A (and firm B). 
(b) The sponsor of scheme C can offer a high priority on company liquidation to the pension
scheme by making it a secured creditor. For example, in November 2002 Intelek gave itsISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-09
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pension scheme a charge of £2.4 million on the US assets of its subsidiary; while in
October 2003 ICI announced setting up a subsidiary owning £250 million of ICI debtors.
The ICI pension scheme was the only creditor of this subsidiary.
(c) The trustees of scheme C may be given enhanced powers, e.g. the power to set the
contribution rate, or the rules governing the allocation of a surplus on wind-up may be
changed. 
(d) A wide range of business decisions can influence the strength of the sponsor’s covenant,
e.g. signing a long term contract to supply goods or services, selling a failing subsidiary,
moving into a profitable new market.
(e) The sponsor can undertake a covenant under which it agrees not to increase its debt level
beyond some specified maximum, which will limit any future deterioration in its debt-
equity ratio.
(f) Concerns about the sponsor’s covenant are positively linked to the scheme’s funding
ratio, and therefore the injection of a large sum of money into scheme C will reduce any
concerns about the sponsor’s covenant. The sponsor can issue debt, and inject the
proceeds into the pension scheme. In June 2003 General Motors issued $10 billion of
bonds for injection into its pension scheme, while in March 2004 Marks & Spencer
borrowed £400 million for injection into its pension scheme. This action increases the
solvency of the pension scheme, but weakens the sponsor’s covenant by increasing its
debt-equity ratio. Injecting funds into the pension scheme before or after the merger is
considered further in section 2b.
Balance of Power. There may also be concern about differences in the balance of power as
between the trustees and the sponsor of the transferring and receiving schemes. These differences
can form part of the merger negotiations, and it may be possible to find an outcome acceptable
to all parties.
Flooding. The potential for flooding exists whenever scheme C has a surplus, and the powers of
the sponsor are sufficient to introduce a contribution holiday. It can be prevented by increasing
the powers of the trustees of scheme C in setting the contribution rate.
The balance of power between the trustees and sponsor and the potential for flooding can be
addressed as part of the rules governing the operation of scheme C. Provided the sponsor is not
liquidated or the scheme wound up, the strength of their covenant does not directly alter the
amount of money available to pay or improve benefits; although it does affect the risk of default
on the pensions promise. Taken together, it will be shown below that the zero profit and dilution
criteria require both schemes A and B to be fully funded at the time of the merger. Therefore the
strength of the sponsor’s covenant is likely to be of secondary importance, behind dilution and
the profit or loss on the merger. While it would be possible to model a risk-return trade-off
between the strength of the covenant and the funding ratio, is not considered further in this paper.
2. Valuing Schemes and Adjusting the Funding Ratios
2a. Merger Basis. A key feature of the problem is the actuarial assumptions used to value the
assets and liabilities transferred from scheme B, which is termed “the merger basis”. Since the
aim is to rule out economic profits or losses and cross-subsidies, the liabilities should be valued
using an unbiased forecast of their current economic value. Therefore the valuation basis should
not be unduly strong or weak, while the chosen funding method (e.g. the projected unit) shouldISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-09
Hammond (1962) recommends the use of the same funding method for both schemes.
8
Alternatively, Chapman and Jagelman (1980) suggest that a surplus on scheme B might be allowed for by giving
9
the former members of scheme B a higher priority in the event of a winding-up of scheme C (which requires
the scheme to be sectionalized). Similarly, Greenstreet (2002) mentions altering the priority order on a winding-
up, but argues that such provisions are hard to operate, and the statutory provisions cannot be overridden.
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be economically appropriate. The same financial assumptions should be used for schemes A and
B; as the money will be invested in a pooled manner by scheme C . The demographic
8
assumptions may differ because the two groups of members may have different longevity, ill-
health, withdrawal rates etc, which are expected to be maintained in the future. Although
different, these demographic assumptions should be of equal strength, relative to the
circumstances of each scheme’s membership. Scheme A will want the use of a strong actuarial
basis to value scheme B’s liabilities, while scheme B will want a weak actuarial basis.
Negotiation should produce an agreed set of actuarial assumptions and funding method that
approximates to the merger basis.
The merger agreement may make allowance for a surplus or deficit on the pension schemes of
the companies concerned. A takeover bid may include the condition that the target company
makes good any deficit on its pension scheme, Chapman and Jagelman (1980, 1982).
Alternatively, the bidder can reduce their offer by the amount of any pension deficit, and inject
this money into scheme B immediately after the takeover. If scheme B is in surplus, and this
surplus is to be included in the merged pension scheme, the value of the takeover bid can be
increased, Chapman and Jagelman (1980), Hammond (1962) . 
9
2b. Side Receipts and Payments. There are a number of ways in which the funding ratio of a
scheme can be increased or decreased, and these will be termed side receipts and side payments
respectively. Side receipts effectively increase the funding ratio of a scheme, and may take the
form of:- 
(a)  a capital sum injected into the scheme by the sponsor immediately before the merger, 
(b)  an agreement for the sponsor to make a payment with the requisite present value into
scheme C, paid in installments over a number of years, and 
(c)  an agreement to pay a higher employer’s contribution rate than otherwise for a specified
period to scheme C, in respect of the former members of one of the merged schemes. 
A scheme funding ratio can effectively be reduced by side payments, which may take the form
of:- 
(a)  a lower employer’s contribution rate than otherwise for a specified period to scheme C,
in respect of the former members of one of the merged schemes, and
(b)  an increase in the accrued benefits for scheme members immediately before the merger.
In practice there may be upper limits on the magnitude of side receipts, as the employer may be
unable to inject unlimited sums into their pension scheme. If the sponsor of scheme B is wholly
owned by a parent company, this parent will receive the proceeds of the sale of its subsidiary, and
these can be injected into scheme B to remove a deficit computed on the merger basis. However,
if the sponsor of scheme B is not a subsidiary of another company, the proceeds of the acquisition
will go to its shareholders, and may be unavailable for rectifying any deficit in scheme B. There
may also be a limit on the extent to which the contribution rate can be reduced (e.g. a
contribution holiday). The upper bound on side payments will probably be large, e.g. aISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-09
The value of the assets increases as investment returns rise, while the value of the liabilities increases as interest
10
rates fall. If there is a constant relationship between investment returns and interest rates (as is the case for an
all gilt portfolio), they can be collapsed into a single factor. 
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contribution holiday for many years; while the upper bound on side receipts will probably be
smaller. 
3. Derivation of Feasible Regions
This section develops simple mathematical models which specify the initial conditions for which
either one or both of the merger criteria are met. Let the market values of the assets of schemes
At Bt A and B at time t be A and  A,  while the values of the liabilities (valued using the merger basis)
At Bt at time t are L  and L . Let the present value of any side payments which reduce the funding
At A Bt B A B ratio be AP and  AP,  where P  and P are assumed constant over time. Similarly denote the
At A Bt B A present value of any increases in the funding ratio (side receipts) by AR and AR, where R
B and R are also assumed constant over time.
A major influence on the current value of a scheme’s assets and liabilities (and hence its funding
ratio) is the state of the financial markets. While this relationship is complex, for simplicity it is
t assumed that the funding ratio before side payments and receipts at time t (FR) for both schemes
is a positive linear function of some measure of the state of the financial markets at time t
t (denoted M): -
10
At At At A A t FR   / A/ L =  " + $ M (1a)
Bt Bt Bt B B t FR  / A/ L =  " + $ M (1b)
The funding ratios can be adjusted by side payments and receipts up to some maximum amounts.
Letting the maximum values of P and R be denoted by P* and R* respectively, the maximum and
t minimum adjusted funding ratios at time t (AFR) for schemes A and B are:-
At A At A A A t Min AFR  = (1 + P* )FR  = (1 + P* )("  + $ M) (2a)
Bt B Bt B B B t Min AFR  = (1 + P* )FR  = (1 + P* )("  + $ M) (2b)
At A At A A A t Max AFR  = (1 !R* )FR  = (1 !R* )("  + $ M) (2c)
Bt B Bt B B B t Max AFR  = (1 !R* )FR  = (1 !R* )("  + $ M) (2d)
The conditions required by the two different views of an acceptable merger will now be
considered. 
3a. Zero Profit or Loss. The first criterion requires that the transfer of the members of scheme
B to scheme A to form scheme C does not involve an actuarial profit or loss. In which case the
adjusted funding ratio of scheme B immediately before the merger must be 100%. For the
trustees of scheme B to agree to the merger, scheme A is required to have a funding ratio of 100%
or better. Using the previous notation, this can be stated as:-
Bt Bt B Bt Bt B, Bt B B Bt A  + A R  = L  + A P       or    A (1 + R  ! P )/L  = 100% (3a)
At At A At At A, At A A At A +  AR $  L  + A P      or    A (1 + R  ! P )/L  $ 100% (3b)
BB B B ,B B ,AA A A A A where P , R  $ 0,   P  # P*   R  # R*   P , R  $ 0,   P  # P*    and R  # R*
Either side payments or side receipts may be required to adjust the funding ratio of scheme B so
that equation (3a) is met. Provided the required side receipts and payments are within the
Bt permitted bounds, AFR  can be made equal to 100%. Figure 1 shows the relationship between
market conditions and the adjusted funding ratio. 
B tBB t The line FR  = "  + $ M gives the relationship between market conditions and the unadjustedISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-09
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funding ratio. This funding ratio can then be adjusted upwards or downwards by side payments
UL or receipts, until the maximum payment or receipt is reached (i.e. the lines B  and B  show result
of the maximum receipts and payments, respectively). Above the 100% funding ratio line, side
payments are required, and below this line, side receipts are indicated. For example, if the market
1B t conditions are M , then an AFR  of between W and X can be achieved; while if the market
2B t conditions are M , an AFR  of anywhere between Y and Z can be achieved. More generally, for
tB t U L each value of M, an AFR  between the B  and B  lines can be attained. Depending on the values
BB t B B of  P* , R*  and M, (as well as "  and $ ) it may be possible to achieve an adjusted funding ratio
U of 100% for scheme B. Figure 1 shows that the 100% line intersects the B  line when the market
3L 5 t level is M , while it intersects the B  line when the market level is M . For values of M between
35 3 M  and M , an adjusted funding ratio of 100% for scheme B can be achieved. Over the range M
44 to  M , there will be side receipts to increase the initial funding ratio to 100%, while from M  to
5 M  there will be side payments to reduce the initial funding ratio to 100%.
As well as moving the funding ratio for scheme B to 100%, the funding ratio of scheme A must
U be at least 100%, as set out in inequality (3b). This is analyzed in figure 2. The line A  represents
t the highest funding ratio that can be reached for scheme A by side receipts. For values of M $
6 M, the adjusted funding ratio of scheme A can be made at least 100% by side receipts. For values
t7 of  M above M , the unadjusted funding ratio of scheme A will be above 100%, and side receipts
are not required.
Figure 1: Zero Profit or Loss - Scheme BISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-09
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The salient features of figures 1 and 2 are combined in figure 3, which shows that the scheme
5t3 B  funding ratio can be adjusted to 100% for values of M  > M > M ; while the scheme A funding
t6 ratio can be adjusted to 100% or above for values of M > M. Therefore, in this case, in order
5 for the “no actuarial profit or loss” condition to be met for both schemes, it is required that M
t6 > M > M . If this condition is not met, is impossible to devise a zero profit or loss merger. 
36 Alternatively, it is possible that M >  M and equation (3) can be met in the circumstances shown
in figure 4, leading to two alternative conditions for no actuarial profit or loss:-
5t63 Figure 3 M  > M > M  > M (4a)
5t36 Figure 4 M  > M > M  > M (4b)
Figure 2: Zero Profit or Loss - Scheme A
Figure 3: Zero Profit or Loss - Schemes A and B (1)ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-09
For the moment, the objective of no actuarial profit or loss on the merger will be dropped.
11
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Inequality (4) reveals that the ability to negotiate a scheme merger without an actuarial profit or
t loss depends on the level of the market variable, M. Thus, the timing of a merger may be crucial.
In practice, it is quite likely that inequality (4) is met because the funding ratios of pension
46t 5t schemes usually tend to cluster around 100%, and so M .  M .  M; which implies that M >  M
36 > (M , M ). In which case it is possible to ensure zero actuarial profit or loss on a scheme merger.
3b. Zero Dilution of the Funding Ratio . The criterion that neither scheme should have its initial
11
funding ratio diluted requires that the adjusted funding ratios of schemes A and B immediately
before the merger are equal, and this can be stated as:-
At A A At Bt B B Bt A (1 + R  ! P )/L  = A (1 + R  ! P )/L   (5)
ABAB A A B B A * A B B where P , P , R , R  $ 0,    P  # P* ,   P  # P* ,   R  # R ,   and R  # R*  
By side payments and receipts, it may be possible to equate the adjusted funding ratios of
schemes A and B, and this is shown in figure 5.
Figure 4: Zero Profit or Loss - Schemes A and B (2) 
Figure 5: Zero Dilution of the Funding Ratio (1)ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-09
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tt Figure 5 presents a possible relationship between M and FR for both schemes A and B. It also
shows the maximum extent to which these funding ratios can be adjusted by side payments and
UU receipts. The lines labeled A  and B  represent the maximum values of the AFR for schemes A
LL and  B respectively, while the lines labeled A  and B  show the minimum AFR values. When the
8L U level of the market is M , the FR of scheme A can be adjusted to be anywhere between A  and A ,
UL while the FR of scheme B can be adjusted to be anywhere between B  and B . Therefore the FR
UL . of both schemes can be equalized by adjusting them to some common value between A  and B .
In this case, the funding ratio of scheme B is reduced by side payments, while the funding ratio
of scheme A is increased by side receipts.  The common AFR will be decided by negotiation.
t9 Given the situation shown in figure 5, equation (5) is met if M > M, the point of intersection
UL between  A  and B . More generally, there are a range of situations in which equation (5) can be
met, and these further possibilities appear in figures 6, 7 and 8.
Figure 6: Zero Dilution of the Funding Ratio (2)
Figure 7: : Zero Dilution of the Funding Ratio (3)ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-09
If a two factor model is used, in which equities and interest rates move differently, a solution may be possible.
12
11 Copyright © 2005 Sutcliffe
The four possible conditions for meeting equation (5) are:-
t9 Figure 5 M > M (6a)
1 0t9 Figure 6 M  > M > M (6b)
t Figure 7 M > 0 (6c)
11 t Figure 8 M  > M > 0 (6d)
t It is possible that the AFRs do not intersect at any level of M, and a zero dilution merger is
impossible for any level of M . Inequality (6), and therefore equation (5) is more likely to be met
12
tA B when the two schemes have different levels of responsiveness to M, i.e. $   $ , as well as
different values of ". This may occur when the schemes have different asset allocations, or
different levels of maturity. Inequality (6) is also more likely to be met when the upper bounds
on side payments and receipts are large. It was previously argued that the funding ratios of both
schemes will tend to be in the vicinity of 100%. Therefore the funding ratios will be fairly
similar, and tend to rise and fall together as the market changes. In consequence, there is a
reasonable prospect that side receipts and payments will enable a dilution-free outcome, although
this cannot be guaranteed.
3c. Zero Profit or Loss and Zero Dilution. Depending on whether the objective is “zero profit
or loss”, or “zero dilution”, the merger terms may differ, and a merger that is acceptable under
one approach may be unacceptable under the other. This raises the question of the conditions that
are required before both merger criteria can be met simultaneously. The combined condition that
the adjusted funding ratios are both equal to 100% is:-
At A A At Bt B B Bt A (1 + R  ! P )/L   =  A (1 + R  ! P )/L   =  100%  (7)
ABAB A A B B A * A B B where P , P , R , R  $ 0,   P  # P* ,   P  # P* ,   R  # R    and R  # R*  
Equation (7) requires that inequalities (4) and (6) are met simultaneously, giving 2×4 = 8
possibilities. Using the situations depicted in figures 3 and 5 as an example, the combined
position is shown in figure 9. 
Figure 8: : Zero Dilution of the Funding Ratio (4)ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-09
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Only the zero profit or loss condition is affected by the position of the 100% funding horizontal
line. In figure 9 this line can rise to infinity, or fall to point Z, and both merger criteria continue
to be met. However, if this line drops below point Z, neither merger condition is met. Figure 10
presents the case depicted in figure  6. The shaded regions in figures 5 to 8 represent the
t combination of values of the funding ratio and M for which both the zero profit and the no
dilution criteria are met. These shaded regions show that often both criteria can be met for a very
wide range of positions of the 100% line. The only exception is the diamond shape in figure 6.
This suggests that, in practice, it may often be possible to meet both merger criteria
simultaneously.
4. Conclusions
The conditions under which two pension schemes merge is an under-researched question that has
recently assumed increased importance. Two criteria have been proposed for judging scheme
mergers:- no actuarial profit or loss, and no dilution of the funding ratio. The strength of the
sponsor’s covenant, the balance of power between trustees and sponsor and the potential for
flooding are also of importance, but were not included as additional criteria. If the two merger
criteria are met, both merging schemes will be well funded, and the covenant will be of
secondary importance; while flooding and the balance of powers are independent of the two
merger criteria.
The merger basis for use by actuaries in valuing the two schemes was defined; and the use of side
receipts and payments to remove the profit or loss and dilution effect explained. Various
circumstances under which there is no profit or loss and no dilution were then presented. It was
argued that fully funded pension schemes should generally be able to satisfy one or other of these
conditions; although simultaneously meeting both is more challenging. Whether or not it is
possible to meet the merger criteria depends on the current state of the financial markets, amongst
other things; and it may be sensible to delay merging pension schemes until market conditions
are more favourable, or to strike while the iron is hot if the merger criteria are currently met.
Figure 9: Zero Profit or Loss and Zero Dilution of the
Funding RatioISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance 2005-09
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The model presented in this paper can be developed in a number of directions. First, the single
financial market factor could be divided into two or more factors (e.g. equity returns and gilt
returns). This would create n dimensional diagrams, and give more ways in which both merger
criteria can be satisfied simultaneously. Second, the strength of the employer’s covenant could
be introduced as a third merger criterion. Third, an empirical investigation could be conducted
into the extent to with which the merger criteria can be met in reality.
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